There can be no doubt that the United States and Israel have devastated Iran's military capabilities and greatly added to the strain on its economy, which was already in perilous condition, since the initiation of joint military operations on February 28.
Centcom reports that the joint operation has destroyed 80 percent of Iran's air defense systems, more than 450 ballistic missile storage facilities, more than 800 Shahed attack drone storage facilities, more than 2,000 command-and-control nodes, over 90 percent of Iran's navy, 95 percent of its mines, and 90 percent of its weapons factories. Given the vast number of strikes, the high quality of Israeli and American intelligence, Iran's total lack of air defenses, those figures are highly creditable.
Jerusalem Post diplomatic corresponded Herb Keinon sums up: "[Israel] faces fewer significant threats after Operation Roaring Lion – far fewer – than it did before. Iran, in turn, is weaker, considerably weaker, than it was."
At the very least, Iran has been set back close to a decade. And that it more than enough time for the Gulf States to develop alternative routes for their energy resources other than the Strait of Hormuz, including building a pipeline from Saudi Arabia, through Jordan, and to the Mediterranean via Israel.
STILL, THERE is considerable debate, as to whether Operation Epic Fury constitutes a strategic victory for the United States and Israel. Many have gone so far as to claim that the Iranian regime has been strengthened by virtue of its survival and discovery of the power wielded by its ability to stop global oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Some of this criticism is sour grapes from those, like New York Times columnist Tom Friedman, determined that those "awful people" – i.e., Trump and Netanyahu, should not be declared winners. An early CNN report of serious American casualties in the rescue of an American airman shot down over Iran, without a shred of basis, is an example of the mindset.
Then there are those veterans of the Obama administration, such as Ben Rhodes, the original creator of the "echo chamber" of support for the JCPOA, and Jake Sullivan, eager to see Trump forced by economic pressure from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz into some sort of negotiated settlement with Iran akin to the Obama administration's JCPOA: a sunset clause with regard to limitations on Iran's enrichment of uranium to weapons level and vast sums of money in the form of sanctions relief, along with no restrictions on its ballistic missile program. (See Lee Smith's, "Return of the Echo Chamber," in Tablet.)
But not all those questioning the strategic outcome are inveterate Trump and Netanyahu haters or supporters of the defunct JCPOA. Leading economic historian Niall Ferguson of the Hoover Institute has written at length of parallels between the present and the Suez campaign of 1956, in which the overwhelming military victories of Israeli, French and English forces secured no strategic gains, and its aftermath marked Britain's loss of big power status.
Michael Totten charges that Trump was not daunted by the prospect of war with Iran, as were his predecessors. But that is only because "he had no idea what he was getting into and didn't bother to find out. . . . Trump has access to the sharpest minds and most experienced hands in the world, but he wouldn't listen to any of them," according to Totten. By repeatedly promising that the war would be short, he signaled to the Iranians that all they had to do was hold out, until economic pressure from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and domestic political pressure on Trump forced him to the bargaining table.
There is evidence to support Totten's thesis. As Totten points out, "Few nightmare scenarios have been more thoroughly war-games than [Iranian attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz." Yet, it took over a month from the time that the idea was first suggested by Richard Haass, the long-time head of the Council on Foreign Relations, for Trump to declare a blockade on shipping to and from Iran.
Such a blockade takes advantage of Iran's greatest vulnerability: It has almost no oil refining capacity, and is therefore dependent on refined oil products from abroad for its energy, despite its vast oil and natural gas reserves. And without the earnings from the sale of its oil, the regime has no way to pay the minions of the IRGC or the Basij militias upon which it relies to terrorize the population. The official currency, the rial, is already worthless.
In the meantime, Trump relied on threats to bomb Iranian civilization back to the stone age. Even if he was serious, which is always questionable, that course would have thoroughly alienated the tens of millions of Iranians whom he hopes will rise up, sooner or later, and overthrow the regime, and would have left their country beyond repair it they do so.
Operation Epic Fury has been further criticized as a "war of choice," with no clearly articulated purpose, and undertaken at enormous cost. Moreover, the critics charge, it has not resulted in regime change. In addition, it is argued that Epic Fury will benefit America's leading rivals, Russian and China. Russia by raising the price for its oil and the removal of US sanctions, at least temporarily, on that oil; China by diverting enormous military resources to the Middle East from the South China Sea. In addition, it is suggested that an inconclusive outcome will cause the Gulf States to turn from the US to China for protection from Iran.
The Hudson Institutes' Michael Doran thoroughly refutes these later critiques in "Seven Myths About the Iran War," (Tablet, April 13). They derive, whether emanating from the progressive left or the MAGA "restrainers," from three principles fixed in stone, but without empirical support: Pull back militarily from the Middle East, engage Iran diplomatically, and distance America from Israel.
Doran begins by noting that Epic Fury was by no means a war of choice, not in Trump's eyes, and certainly not Netanyahu's, and the basis for it was clearly articulated. Secretary of State Marco Rubio put the danger posed by Iran in terms of "overmatch." Since August 2025, Iran has been rebuilding its ballistic missile stockpile at a breakneck pace. Israeli intelligence estimated that it would have a stockpile of 8,000 ballistic missiles by 2027. As Rubio put it in a March 2 press conference, "They are producing, by some estimates, over 100 of these missiles a month. Compare that to the six or seven interceptors that can be built a month."
The threat of those missiles was twofold. They could overwhelm the defenses of Israel and every American base in the region. And at the same time, the huge conventional arsenal would constitute a shield that would allow Iran to proceed with attaining a nuclear weapon without fear. Given those threats, Trump chose to work together with Israel to eliminate it, at a time that Iran's weak or non-existent air defenses rendered it highly vulnerable to attack.
Though only a complete overthrow of the Islamic Revolution can remove the Iranian threat entirely, regime change was not the goal of Operation Epic Fury, or of Israel's Operation Roaring Lion. No one dreamed that an air campaign alone could bring about regime change. And it was clear from the beginning that President Trump would never embark on the military campaign involving ground troops that would have been required to overthrow the current regime. Doing so, would have violated his every campaign promise since first launching his bid for the White House in 2015.
At most, the devastating air campaign might create conditions more favorable to a successful popular uprising. And on that, the jury is still out and may be for years. Mehdi Parpanchi, executive editor of Iran International, a journal of Iranian expatriates opposed to the Islamic regime, points out: "Some [regimes] survive extreme pressure far longer than expected. But sometimes the force that breaks a system needs to arrive only after the structure has already been weakened. Even a feather can break a camel's back."
Certainly, the Islamic Republic has been greatly weakened. For decades it has portrayed itself as the dominant power on the march in the Middle East, with control over four Arab capitals, of a Shiite Crescent stretching from Iran, through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. That crescent now lies in tatters, and the Iranian military is rubble.
Iran's economy is incapable of rebuilding what has been destroyed or meeting the needs of the population. The country is experiencing hyper-inflation and the official currency is worthless. That situation will only worsen as the effects of the US blockade begin to be felt. If fully successful, that blockade is estimated to cost the regime $435 million dollars a day in lost revenues and completely implode the Iranian economy. James Stavridis, former NATO supreme commander, summarizes the impact, "Their economy will be choked . . . and the US and our allies are no worse off than we were after the Iranians started holding the Strait hostage."
At some point, Iran will run out of capacity to store all the oil that it can no longer transport – perhaps as little as 13 days – and will have to start capping wells. Once capped wells are very difficult to reopen.
True, naval blockades require enormous naval resources and are hugely expensive to maintain. Nor are they without risks. Seizing ships is tricky, and would be even more so if Iran places military personnel on board its own ships. Nor will seizing Chinese ships be without consequences. But so far, the blockade seems to be working. According to Centcom, nineteen ships have already been directed back to Iranian ports, without any confirmed reports of ships getting through the blockade.
Those currently leading Iran may be even more brutal than their predecessors, and lacking the late Ayatollah Khameini's concern to retain religious legitimacy, at least for the portion of the population that is religiously devout. But they are playing a losing hand.
Fissures have already begun to develop in the ruling elite, in particular between the civilian leadership and that of IRGC. Both the president and foreign minister, for instance, publicly apologized to Gulf neighbors for the military attacks on them, though those attacks continue.
In response, the Gulf states have opened the records of their banks, through which Iran routed many of its receipts to avoid sanctions, to US Treasury investigation. That will allow the US, according to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, to freeze more funds of the IRGC leadership and other regime officials. On March 31, writes Zineh Riboui of the Hudson Institute, dozens of money changers linked to the IRGC, were arrested across the United Arab Emirates, severing one more critical cash artery and making it difficult for the regime to pay its operatives. A network that cannot pay its operatives cannot function for long.
As the regime struggles internally, Iran's restive ethnic minorities, particularly the Kurds, will test its mettle. The Mossad has established a web of contacts with opponents of the regime, including the Kurds, with whom it has a long relationship, and these will be activated when the time comes. The IAF acted repeatedly during Operation Roaring Lion to take out Basij militias seeking to maintain internal control, and will no doubt do so again, in the event of an uprising.
THE BIGGEST OPEN QUESTION is how will the US conduct negotiations with the Iranian regime during the ceasefire. Will it act from a position of strength – something that was never done during the JCPOA negotiations, for instance – or will President Trump look for a quick exit loaded with incentives for the regime to accept.
The president is on record as having called the JCPOA "the worst agreement ever negotiated." But he must be careful not to repeat its mistakes. One worrisome sign was that Vice-President Vance offered Iran a twenty-year moratorium on nuclear enrichment during negotiations in Islamabad, rather than demanding a permanent ban. Remember that the digital clock in Tehran's Palestine Square that began counting the days until the "annihilation of Israel" in 2017 was set to reach zero along with the expiration of all restrictions on the Islamic Republic's nuclear enrichment under the JCPOA.
No less important, Iran must not receive another infusion of tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief as it did under the JCPOA and latter under the Biden administration. That money would only be used to try to reconstitute its proxy "ring of fire" around Israel, especially to Hezbollah and the Houthis, both of whom retain offensive capabilities. Without funding from Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas face complete bankruptcy, and there is no reason to let them off the ropes.
So, while a great deal of uncertainty remains over the events of coming weeks and months, both the United States and Israel are far safer from the Iranian threat than they were on February 28.